Total Information Awareness (TIA) System links / gov reports on propaganda/ crypto:
Dec 23:;
Many
Tools of Big Brother Are Up and Running http://www.nytimes.com/2002/12/23/technology/23PEEK.html
aclu on TIA
Current Information Awareness Office Web Site http://www.darpa.mil/iao
The New York Times,
November 18, 2002
Editorial A Snooper's
Dream
http://cryptome.org/tia-eyeball.htm cryptome maps of poindxter home
Keeping
Track of John Poindexter 02:00 AM Dec. 14, 2002 PT
The head of the government's Total Information Awareness project, which aims
to root out potential terrorists by aggregating credit-card, travel, medical,
school and other records of everyone in the United States, has himself become
a target of personal data profiling.
http://www.stop-fascism.org/oia.htm
In German:: http://kai.iks-jena.de/miniwahr/tias-iao.html
Subject: Total
Information Awareness Demonstration for Poindexter
http://sfweekly.com/issues/2002-11-27/smith.html/1/index.html
The SF Weekly's column by Matt Smith in the Dec 3 issue points out that there
may be some information that John M. and Linda Poindexter of 10 Barrington Fare,
Rockville, MD, 20850, may be missing in their pursuit of total information awareness.
He suggests that people with information to offer should phone +1 301 424 6613
to speak with that corrupt official and his wife. Neighbors Thomas E.
Maxwell, 67, at 8 Barringon Fare (+1 301 251 1326), James F. Galvin, 56, at
12 (+1 301 424 0089), and Sherrill V. Stant (nee Knight) at 6, may also lack
some information that would be valuable to them in making decisions -- decisions
that could affect the basic civil rights of every American.
Some people are suspicious that the degenerate Poindexter's Total Information
Awareness system will be used to harass and track the activities of people who
some significant fraction of society disagree with. They fear a replacement
of today's general tolerance (and official blindness to one's Bill-of-Rights-protected
activities such as speech and association), with specific harassment of those
whose names pop up in the database. Such harassment of people who are
not reasonably suspected of criminal activity would destroy much of value in
our society, such as the presumption of innocence and the "live and let
live" philosophy that encourages diversity. Offering dissidents "a
death of a thousand cuts" by constantly harassing them and denying them
the privileges of ordinary life would be far worse than charging them with a
(bogus) crime, which they could clear up merely by demonstrating their innocence
in court.
It would be good to have an early public demonstration of just how bad life
could become for such targeted citizens. While ratfink's system is probably
not working yet, and a large part of it is classified, much of it can be manually
simulated for demonstration purposes. Public records can be manually searched
and then posted to the net by people who happen to be looking there for something
else. Many Internet public records search sites also exist; try searching
for "People finder". (Matt Smith at matt.smith@sfweekly.com
has offered to "publish anything that readers can convincingly claim to
have obtained legally".) Photographs and videos of the target, their
house, car, family, and associates, can be made and circulated to demonstrate
facial recognition techniques.
Employees at various businesses and organizations such as airlines, credit card
authorizers, rental-car agencies, shops, gyms, schools, tollbooths, garbage
services, banks, taxis, honest civil servants and police officers, and restaurants
could demonstrate denial of service to such targeted people. A simple
"We won't serve YOUR KIND OF PEOPLE" would do, as was practiced on
black people for many decades. More subtle forms of denial of service are possible,
such as "You've been 'randomly' selected as a security risk, I'll have
to insist that [some degrading thing happen to you]". Or merely,
"I can't seem to get this credit card to work, sir, and those twenties
certainly look counterfeit to me."
Those with access to DMV and criminal records databases, credit card records,
telephone bills, tax records, birth and death and marriage records, medical
records, and similar personally identifiable databases could combine their information
publicly to assist in the demonstration. This is how TIA is intended to
work -- the government would get privileged access to all these databases, access
that the rest of us do not normally have. But some of us have access to
various of these databases today, and can demonstrate how the TIA system might
work.
People who associated closely with such a targeted individual, such as their
families, relatives, friends, neighbors, protective secret service agents, and
business associates, might find themselves swept up in the information dragnet.
Such a demonstration would graphically reveal the societal dangers of deploying
such systems on a wide scale against a large number of citizens -- preferably
early enough that such a deployment could be prevented, rather than reversed
after major harm was caused.
Even if some of the information that people end up revealing or using about
such targeted scumbags is incorrect, such a public demonstration would highlight
the damaging effects that incorrect database information can have on innocent
peoples' lives, when used to target them for harassment without due process
of law. When this happens to innocents under classified or secret systems
such as the No-Fly lists, the public seldom finds out about it.
All in all I think such a demonstration would be highly educational, as well
as newsworthy and entertaining.
John Gilmore
18 December 2002
The New York Times on December 16, 2002 reported on the Department of Defense's
"classified" Directive 3600.1 for propaganda operations against US
allies (copy of article below). This document appears to be an unclassified
version of the classified proposal.
REVISION ONE
1
Department of Defense
DIRECTIVE
October #, 2001
Number 3600.1
ASD(C3I)
SUBJECT: Information Operations (IO)
References: (a). DoD Directive S-3600.1, "Information Operations (U),"
December 9, 1996 (hereby canceled)
(b). DoD Instruction S-3600.2, "Information Operations Security Classification
Guidance (U)," August 6, 1998
A. REISSUANCE AND PURPOSE
This Directive reissues reference (a) to update Information Operations policy,
definition, and responsibilities within the Department of Defense (DoD).
B. APPLICABILITY
This Directive applies to the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Military
Departments, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Combatant Commands,
the Inspector General of the DoD, the Defense Agencies, and the DoD Field Activities
(hereafter referred to collectively as "the DoD Components").
C. DEFINITIONS
1. Information Operations (IO). Actions taken to affect adversary information,
information systems and decision making, while defending one's own information,
information systems and decision making.
2. All other terms used in this Directive are defined in the enclosure.
D. POLICY
1. The DoD supports the national security strategy and national objectives through
the accomplishment of a variety of missions that range the spectrum of military
operations, from peace to war. In peacetime the DoD conducts activities to accomplish
these missions and shape the international environment. In conflict, as in peacetime,
information superiority enables the DoD to direct the full power of Information
Age concepts and technologies; transforming capabilities for maneuver, strike,
logistics, protection and situation awareness into full spectrum dominance.
a. A primary focus of IO (defensively and offensively) is ultimately on decision-makers;
the information they acquire and use to make decisions, the information they
generate in making decisions and the full range of systems and organizations
involved in handling, processing and
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Page 2
REVISION ONE
DoDD 3600.1
2
implementing this information. IO may also be used to effect the automated component
of a weapon system.
b. IO, conducted as an integral element of land, sea, air, space, special and
joint operations, contributes to information superiority by protecting military
decision-making from adversary attacks and as necessary degrades an adversary's
decision-making, thereby producing a relative information advantage.
(1) One set of IO activities employed by the DoD Components focuses on the perceptions
and attitudes of decision-makers or groups.
(2) A second set of IO activities also employed by the DoD Components focuses
on attacking or defending the electromagnetic spectrum, information systems,
and information which supports decision makers, command and control and automated
responses.
c. The DoD's activities to conduct IO include psychological operations (PSYOP),
electronic warfare (EW) (including directed energy), computer network operations
(CNO), information assurance (IA), military deception, security, and counterintelligence.
2. IO exploits the opportunities and vulnerabilities inherent in dependence
on information supporting military activities. Therefore, IO will be considered
by DoD components when developing policy, doctrine, and capabilities (to include
the full range of responsibilities to train and equip forces from acquisition
through maintenance and sustainment) as well as the planning and execution of
operations.
3. Public affairs (PA) and civil affairs (CA) represent related activities which,
like IO, can contribute to achieving a commander's overall objectives in shaping
the information environment.
a. The intent of PA is to truthfully inform the public and thus shall not focus
on directing or manipulating public actions or opinion. As such, PA can be useful
as a counter to adversary propaganda and disinformation. DoD components must
ensure PA offices are aware of the military objective and ensure mutually supporting
efforts.
b. CA activities support DoD informational objectives by influencing, developing,
or controlling indigenous infrastructures in foreign operational areas, and
can be an alternate means to communicate with the host nation and foreign public.
4. DoD shall integrate IO into theater engagement strategies and campaign plans
to support national policy and strategy.
5. DoD shall coordinate with other USG agencies, as appropriate, DoD engagement
strategies and the employment of IO.
6. DoD shall ensure intelligence supports an array of DoD IO requirements, to
include indications and warning, research, development and acquisition and operational
support. Detailed intelligence on the information systems, decision-making processes,
and human factors is required.
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Page 3
REVISION ONE DoDD 3600.1
3
7. To facilitate efficient development of IO capabilities, the DoD Components
shall share tactics, techniques, procedures and technologies to the maximum
extent practicable.
8. DoD shall develop and conduct education, training and exercise programs to
ensure the successful planning and execution of IO.
E. RESPONSIBILITIES
1. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control, Communications and
Intelligence (ASD(C3I)) shall:
a. Serve as the principal staff assistant to the Secretary of Defense for IO.
b. Provide overarching strategy, policy and guidance for the development and
integration of capabilities to conduct IO.
c. Conduct oversight of the DoD Component's efforts to plan, program, and develop
capabilities in support of validated IO capability requirements.
d. Serve as the DoD proponent for the Information Operations Technology Center.
e. In coordination with Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology
and Logistics (USD(AT&L)), support and guide science and technology efforts
to develop IO capabilities.
f. Lead interagency coordination and allied cooperation concerning intelligence
support, information assurance, counterintelligence, security and the development
of IO related capabilities.
g. Support Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD(P)), in reviewing IO aspects
of CINC OPLANS and Theater Engagement Plans.
h. Coordinate with USD(P) on IO matters that pertain to PSYOP, military deception
or International Public Information.
i. Coordinate with USD(AT&L) when IO matters pertain to acquisition issues,
EW or special programs.
j. Require the Director, Defense Security Information Agency to:
(1) Serve as the DoD focal point to oversee the application of information assurance
(IA) for the Global Information Grid.
(2) Plan, develop, coordinate, and support IA activity to protect and maintain
automated information systems (including the command, control, communications,
and computer systems) which serve the needs of the National Command Authority.
k. Require the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency to:
(1) Manage DoD intelligence community's all-source production to support the
full range of DoD IO intelligence requirements. ------------------------------------------------------------------------
Page 4
REVISION ONE
DoDD 3600.1
4 (2) Oversee IO intelligence requirements, and serve as the DoD intelligence
community focal point, for development, management, and maintenance of information
systems and databases which facilitate timely collection, processing, and dissemination
of all-source, finished intelligence for DoD IO.
(3) Coordinate with the DoD Components to support the development of IO capabilities.
(4) Provide political-military assessments to support the full range of IO,
including the validation of IO threats.
(5) Provide human factors intelligence support, and integrate human factors
analysis with U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) to support and leverage
the capabilities of the PSYOP components.
2. The USD(AT&L) shall:
a. Coordinate with ASD(C3I) when developing policy and conducting oversight
that pertains to EW or other IO related activities.
b. Consider IO threats in the review and approval of acquisition programs.
c. Ensure that adequate science and technology programs exist to support the
development of IO capabilities.
d. As the proponent for EW, develop and maintain a technology investment strategy
to support the development and integration of EW capabilities.
3. The USD(P) shall:
a. As the principal staff assistant to the Secretary of Defense for policy,
strategy and review of operational plans, provide policy guidance and oversight
of the DoD Component's employment of offensive IO capabilities, PSYOP and International
Public Information.
b. Lead interagency discussions and coordination as well as international cooperation
and dialog concerning the employment of IO.
4. The DoD General Counsel shall provide legal advice and assistance to the
Secretary of Defense and other DoD officials on IO plans and capabilities employed.
5. The Secretaries of the Military Departments and the Commander in Chief, USSOCOM
(within their respective U.S. Title X and Major Force Program 11 responsibilities
respectively) shall develop IO doctrine and tactics; and organize, train and
equip to ensure that IO become effective elements of, and integral to, U.S.
military capabilities.
6. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff shall:
a. Serve as the principal military advisor to the Secretary of Defense on IO.
b. Validate IO requirements through the Joint Requirements Oversight Council.
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Page 5
REVISION ONE
DoDD 3600.1
5
c. Establish doctrine to facilitate the integration of IO concepts into joint
operations. Ensure all U.S. military plans and operations include and are consistent
with IO policy, strategy, and doctrine.
7. Commander in Chief, U.S. Joint Forces Command shall ensure that joint concept
development, experimentation, and exercises routinely test and refine IO capabilities,
including the application of realistic wartime stress to information systems.
8. Commander in Chief, U.S. Space Command shall:
a. Coordinate and conduct DoD CND to protect the Defense Information Infrastructure
from adversary CNO.
b. Provide planning and coordination support to the CNA missions of supported
combatant commands.
c. On behalf of other CINCs and in coordination with the Joint Staff, USCINCSPACE
will advocate CNA requirements and assist in Joint Requirements Oversight Council
(JROC) validation as appropriate.
9. The Director, National Security Agency (NSA), shall:
a. Provide a conduit for deconfliction of DoD CNO activities with the intelligence
community (IC) and IC intelligence gain/loss assessments and targeting strategies
to support proposed IO courses of actions.
b. Assess and provide information systems security threat and vulnerability
information, in conjunction with appropriate agencies, to support IO requirements.
c. Coordinate IO support activities with Secretaries of the Military Departments,
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the heads of the DoD Components.
10. The Heads of the DoD Components shall assign responsibilities and establish
procedures within their organizations to implement the policies in section D.,
above. The Component heads shall apprise the ASD(C3I), of developmental efforts
consistent with subsection E.1., above.
F. EFFECTIVE DATE
This Directive is effective immediately.
\\SIGNED\\
Paul Wolfowitz
Deputy Secretary of Defense
Enclosure
Definitions
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Page 6
REVISION ONE
DoDD 3600.1 (Encl 1)
1-1
DEFINITIONS
1. Computer network attack (CNA). Operations to [manipulate] disrupt, deny,
degrade, or destroy information resident in computers and computer networks,
or the computers and networks themselves.
-OR-
1. Computer network attack (CNA): Operations using computer hardware or software,
or conducted through computers or computer networks, with the intended objective
or likely effect of disrupting, denying, degrading, or destroying information
resident in computers and computer networks, or the computers and networks themselves.
2. Computer network defense (CND). Efforts to defend against the CNO of others,
especially that directed against U.S. and allied computer networks.
-OR-
2. Computer network defense (CND): Those measures, internal to the protected
entity, taken to protect and defend information, computers, and networks from
intrusion, exploitation, disruption, denial, degradation, or destruction.
3. Computer network exploitation (CNE). Intelligence collection and enabling
operations to gather data from target adversary automated information systems
(AIS) or networks.
-OR-
3. Computer network exploitation (CNE): Intelligence collection and enabling
operations to gather data from target or adversary automated information systems
or networks. CNE is composed of two types of activities:
(1) enabling activities designed to obtain or facilitate access to the target
computer system where the purpose includes foreign intelligence collection;
and,
(2) collection activities designed to acquire foreign intelligence information
from the target computer system.
4. Computer network operations (CNO) Comprises CNA, CND and CNE collectively.
5. Computer network response (CNR) ["Active Computer Network Defense"]:
Those measures, that do not constitute CNA, taken to protect and defend information,
computers, and networks from disruption, denial, degradation, destruction, or
exploitation that involve activity external to the protected entity. Computer
Network Response, when authorized, may include measures to determine the source
of hostile CNA or CNE.
6. Deception. Those measures designed to mislead an adversary by manipulation,
distortion, or falsification of evidence to induce him to react in a manner
prejudicial to his interests.
7. Electronic warfare. Electromagnetic and directed energy used to control the
electromagnetic spectrum or to attack an adversary.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
7
REVISION ONE
DoDD 3600.1 (Encl 1)
1-2
8. Global Information Grid (GIG). The globally interconnected, end-to-end set
of information capabilities, associated processes, and personnel for collecting,
processing and storing, disseminating and managing information on demand to
warfighters, policy makers, and support personnel. The GIG includes all [USG]
owned and leased communications and computing systems and services, software
(including applications), data, security services, and other associated services
necessary to achieve Information Superiority.
9. Human Factors. The psychological, cultural, behavioral, and other human attributes
that influence decision making, the flow of information, and the interpretation
of information by individuals or groups at any level in a state or organization.
10. Information. Facts, data, or instruction in any medium or form.
11. Information assurance (IA). IO that protect and defend information and information
systems by ensuring their availability, integrity, authentication, confidentiality,
and non-repudiation. This includes providing for restoration of information
systems by incorporating protection, detection, and reaction capabilities.
12. Information superiority. The capabilities to collect, process, and disseminate
an uninterrupted flow of information while exploiting or denying an adversary's
ability to do the same.
13. Information system. The entire infrastructure, organization, personnel and
components that collect, process, store, transmit, display, disseminate, and
act on information.
14. Operations security (OPSEC). A process of identifying critical information
and subsequently analyzing friendly actions attendant to military operations
and other activities to:
a. Identify those actions that can be observed by adversary intelligence systems;
b. Determine indicators hostile intelligence systems might obtain that could
be interpreted or pieced together to derive critical information in time to
be useful to adversaries; c. Select and execute measures that eliminate or reduce
to an acceptable level the vulnerabilities of friendly actions to adversary
exploitation.
15. Psychological operations (PSYOP). Planned operations to convey selected
information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions,
motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of foreign governments,
organizations, groups, and individuals. The purpose of Psychological Operations
is to induce or reinforce foreign attitudes and behavior favorable to the originator's
objectives.
[End directive.]
------------------------------------------------------------------------
http://www.nytimes.com/2002/12/16/international/16MILI.html
Pentagon Debates Propaganda Push in Allied Nations
Pentagon Debates Propaganda Push in Allied Nations
By THOM SHANKER and ERIC SCHMITT
WASHINGTON, Dec. 15 — The Defense Department is considering issuing a secret
directive to the American military to conduct covert operations aimed at influencing
public opinion and policy makers in friendly and neutral countries, senior Pentagon
and administration officials say.
Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld has not yet decided on the proposal, which
has ignited a fierce battle throughout the Bush administration over whether
the military should carry out secret propaganda missions in friendly nations
like Germany, where many of the Sept. 11 hijackers congregated, or Pakistan,
still considered a haven for Al Qaeda's militants.
Such a program, for example, could include efforts to discredit and undermine
the influence of mosques and religious schools that have become breeding grounds
for Islamic militancy and anti-Americanism across the Middle East, Asia and
Europe. It might even include setting up schools with secret American financing
to teach a moderate Islamic position laced with sympathetic depictions of how
the religion is practiced in America, officials said.
Many administration officials agree that the government's broad strategy to
counter terrorism must include vigorous and creative propaganda to change the
negative view of America held in many countries.
The fight, one Pentagon official said, is over "the strategic communications
for our nation, the message we want to send for long-term influence, and how
we do it."
As a military officer put it: "We have the assets and the capabilities
and the training to go into friendly and neutral nations to influence public
opinion. We could do it and get away with it. That doesn't mean we should."
It is not the first time that the debate over how the United States should marshal
its forces to win the hearts and minds of the world has raised difficult and
potentially embarrassing questions at the Pentagon. A nonclandestine parallel
effort at the State Department, which refers to its role as public diplomacy,
has not met with so much resistance.
In February, Mr. Rumsfeld had to disband the Pentagon's Office of Strategic
Influence, ending a short-lived plan to provide news items, and possibly false
ones, to foreign journalists to influence public sentiment abroad. Senior Pentagon
officials say Mr. Rumsfeld is deeply frustrated that the United States government
has no coherent plan for molding public opinion worldwide in favor of America
in its global campaign against terrorism and militancy.
Many administration officials agree that there is a role for the military in
carrying out what it calls information operations against adversaries, especially
before and during war, as well as routine public relations work in friendly
nations like Colombia, the Philippines or Bosnia, whose governments have welcomed
American troops.
In hostile countries like Iraq, such missions are permitted under policy and
typically would include broadcasting from airborne radio stations or dropping
leaflets like those the military has printed to undermine morale among Iraqi
soldiers. In future wars, they might include technical attacks to disable computer
networks, both military and civilian.
But the idea of ordering the military to take psychological aim at allies has
divided the Pentagon — with civilians and uniformed officers on both sides
of the debate.
Some are troubled by suggestions that the military might pay journalists to
write stories favorable to American policies or hire outside contractors without
obvious ties to the Pentagon to organize rallies in support of American policies.
The current battlefield for these issues involves amendments to a classified
Department of Defense directive, titled "3600.1: Information Operations,"
which would enshrine an overarching Pentagon policy for years to come.
Current policy holds that aggressive information tactics are "to affect
adversary decision makers" — not those of friendly or even neutral
nations. But proposed revisions to the directive, as quoted by senior officials,
would not make adversaries the only targets for carrying out military information
operations — abbreviated as "I.O." in the document, which is
written in the dense jargon typical of military doctrine.
"In peacetime, I.O. supports national objectives primarily by influencing
foreign perceptions and decision-making," the proposal states. "In
crises short of hostilities, I.O. can be used as a flexible deterrent option
to communicate national interest and demonstrate resolve. In conflict, I.O.
can be applied to achieve physical and psychological results in support of military
objectives."
Although the defense secretary is among those pushing to come up with a bolder
strategy for getting out the American message, he has not yet decided whether
the military should take on those responsibilities, the officials said.
There is little dispute over such battlefield tactics as destroying an enemy's
radio and television stations. All is considered fair in that kind of war.
But several senior military officers, some of whom have recently left service,
expressed dismay at the concept of assigning the military to wage covert propaganda
campaigns in friendly or neutral countries. "Running ops against your allies
doesn't work very well," Adm. Dennis C. Blair, a retired commander of American
forces in the Pacific, advised Pentagon officials as they began re-examining
the classified directive over the summer. "I've seen it tried a few times,
and it generally is not very effective."
Those in favor of assigning the military an expanded role argue that no other
department is stepping up to the task of countering propaganda from terrorists,
who hold no taboo against deception.
They also contend that the Pentagon has the best technological tools for the
job, especially in the areas of satellite communications and computer warfare,
and that the American military has important interests to protect in some countries,
including those where ties with the government are stronger than the affections
of the population.
For example, as anti-American sentiment has risen this year in South Korea,
intensified recently by the deaths of two schoolgirls who were crushed by an
American armored vehicle, some Pentagon officials were prompted to consider
ways of influencing Korean public opinion outside of traditional public affairs
or community outreach programs, one military official said. No detailed plan
has yet emerged.
Those who oppose the military's taking on the job of managing perceptions of
America in allied states say it more naturally falls to diplomats and civilians,
or even uniformed public affairs specialists. They say that secret operations,
if deemed warranted by the president, should be carried out by American intelligence
agencies.
In addition, they say, the Pentagon's job of explaining itself through public
affairs officers could be tainted by any link to covert information missions.
"These allied nations would absolutely object to having the American military
attempt to secretly affect communications to their populations," said one
State Department official with a long career in overseas public affairs.
Even so, this official conceded: "The State Department can't do it. We're
not arranged to do it, and we don't have the money. And U.S.I.A. is broken."
He was referring to the United States Information Agency, which was absorbed
into the State Department.
One effort to reshape
the nation's ability to get its message out was a proposal by Representative
Henry J. Hyde, an Illinois Republican who is chairman of the House International
Relations Committee. Mr. Hyde is pushing for $255 million to bolster the State
Department's public diplomacy effort and reorganize international broadcasting
activities.
"If we are to be successful in our broader foreign policy goals,"
Mr. Hyde said in a statement, "America's effort to engage the peoples of
the world must assume a more prominent place in the planning and execution of
our foreign policy."