Propaganda

"All effective propaganda must be confined to a few bare essentials and this must be expressed as far as possible in stereotyped formulae." — Adolf Hitler, Mein Kampf

In his Coup d'Etat handbook, Luttwak explains the importance of propaganda in the post-coup period. "Our first objective," says Luttwak, "will be achieved by conveying the reality and strength of the coup instead of trying to justify it."  52   The goal is not to explain the legitimacy of the seizure of power, but simply to emphasize that it is a fait acompli to be accepted as fact.

This very stratagem served as the touchstone for James Baker and the entire Bush apparatus. Rather than act on the confidence of their professed certainty, let alone take the moral high-ground in what everyone agreed were questionable circumstances, the Bush campaign instead did everything it could to derail the recounts and assert the "fact" of their victory.

They did not seek to prove the vote had not been tampered with or that machines had not failed catastrophically. Rather, the issue of the legitimacy of the Florida vote was only addressed in terms of its finality. Through simple repetition, these mere stipulations took on the coloration of fact. The people have spoken, we have a majority (even though evidence suggests otherwise), the deadline has passed, and 3,000 Jewish votes for Buchanan just happened. Tough luck, get over it, now shut up and give us the keys to the Capitol. These same semantics were reflected in the GOP's legal challenges to Gore's calls for perfectly legal (indeed, mandatory) recounts. Bush's hatchet men did not so much justify their position, as they instead merely emphasized over and over that it was a done deal.

Another important propaganda theme was that it was Bush who was truly honoring the law; that it was Gore who was violating the law and thus defiling the sanctity of the democratic process. Through this constant refrain, the Bush campaign sought to create an image of themselves as protectors of these sacred tenets of the nation. This is fully consistent with Luttwak's propaganda strategy:

...[O]ur information campaign...[must]...reassure the general public by dispelling fears that the coup is inspired by foreign and/or extremist elements, and to persuade particular groups that the coup is not a threat to them. The first aim will be achieved by manipulating national symbols and by asserting our belief in the prevailing pieties....  53  

As Luttwak further explains, marginalizing whatever resistance might oppose the coup is equally important. By the same token, creating a sense of isolation and futility among oppositional elements is vital to prevent any possible unification against the coup.

...[N]ews of any resistance against us would act as a powerful stimulant to further resistance by breaking down this feeling of isolation. We must therefore make every effort to withhold such news. If there is in fact some resistance and if its intensity and locale are such as to make it difficult to conceal from particular segments of the public, we should admit its existence; but we should strongly emphasize that it is isolated, the product of the obstinancy of a few misguided or dishonest individuals who are not affiliated to any party or group of significant membership.  54  

An example of the use of such tactics can be found in the way in which the conservative press dealt with Rev. Jesse Jackson and the Miami riot. Following the "Congress Gang" attacks, the GOP propaganda machine first tried to claim the protests had been completely spontaneous. When their cover was blown by the press, the party's pundits and columnists used identical propaganda points to deflect criticism and minimize the intimidation. While the exact words varied somewhat, the startling uniformity of their semantics strongly suggests a coordinated effort.

Within 24 hours after the Miami violence, Paul Gigot used his column in the Wall Street Journal to praise the action as a "burgher rebellion" by otherwise mild-mannered "50-year-old white lawyers" who had been pushed over the edge by the Dems. "If Al Gore loses his brazen attempt to win on the dimples," Gigot wrote, "one reason will be that he finally convinced enough Republicans to fight like Democrats."  55   The clear implication is that it is the Democrats who are the true violent thugs.

The most popular tactic featured classic Reagan-era "Big Lie" assaults on Jesse Jackson. First his role in organizing a Nov. 9 demonstration was derided as "outside agitation" (a classic Cold War ploy), then he was falsely accused of instigating violence that never occurred.

"Jesse Jackson and his minions have now arrived on the scene like malignant cancer cells attracted to a growing tumor," L. Jean Lewis said in one column. "To have them openly encourage rumors of civil rights violations and propagate deliberate unrest is bordering on sedition."  56   In Lewis' world, it's treason for Jackson to speak to a crowd, but just a harmless protest for the Republicans to punch people and throw bricks. It should be noted that Lewis served as an investigator for the RTC following the S&L scandal during the '80s (which also featured CIA involvement). Her findings provided the basis for the overblown Whitewater scandal, that she in turn helped perpetuate through her columns.

Ann Coulter, a self-described "bomb thrower", took the rhetoric even further. "Jesse Jackson is presiding over rioting in the streets," she wrote. "Maybe [Janet Reno] could send in a SWAT team to gun down President-elect George W. Bush."  57   Not only are Democrats thugs, Coulter implies, but they want to assassinate their rival!

But there was no "rioting" by Democrats. No Republicans were ever physically attacked by hired goons, nor were bricks thrown through any of their windows. Furthermore, unlike the Republicans, Jackson never claimed that the demonstrations were spontaneous or entirely local. But by using multiple "journalists" to paint Jackson and others as nothing but "outsiders" fomenting "sedition" and "rioting", the GOP was able to create the impression of a marginalized and silly opposition while simultaneously making it appear as though these were conclusions reached independently by sage observers.


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Published in Lumpen, Jan. 2001. Copyright © 2001 by John Dee. All rights reserved.